

**U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center
Fort Leavenworth, KS
24 January 2011**

SUBJECT: Conference Report, RUSI COIN Conference, London, 8-9 December 2010

1. U.S. Army COIN Center participated in subject conference, the purpose of which was to identify effective practices in the application of counterinsurgency fundamentals to company level operations in support of deploying forces.
2. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and United Kingdom COIN Centre hosted the event with co-sponsors US Army COIN Center, USMC Irregular Warfare Center, and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) COIN Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT). There were 200 attendees, primarily from UK Army, US Army, US Marine Corps, plus academicians and COIN analysts.
3. There were nine sessions with 27 presentations, twelve of which were provided by practitioners on company level operations. Each panel discussion was followed by dialogue with the audience in a question and answer format.
4. From the US perspective, the most significant conference take-aways were based on the COIN Qualification Standards that affect upcoming COIN seminars to deploying US Army Brigade Combat Teams. Among the most important:
 - The primacy of understanding the operational environment/human terrain
 - The fact that decentralized operations are the way of doing business
 - Criticality of partnering with the ANSF and GIRoA at every level
 - Countering insurgent narratives through contact and relationships with Afghan village or government peers
5. The remainder of this report consists of highlights of each presentation and Q&A from panel participants. Information derived from this conference may be used for a variety of education, training and doctrinal development purposes.
6. U.S. Army COIN Center may be reached at coin@conus.army.mil. For COIN educational materials, see <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/>.

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Names have been omitted for non-attribution.

Introductory Comments

Frustrated at lack of consistency – have not been in Afg nine years, but one year nine times. All like to blame lack of political will and grand strategy. COIN is much more mainstream than before. Petraeus said COIN is “all hard, all the time” no mistakes acceptable. It challenges the military to take on this role and to sustain it. COIN lessons learned have not been institutionalized.

Session 1: Overview and Historical Perspectives

- **Charles E. Callwell and the Art of Irregular Warfare**

Irregular Warfare (IW) is the main experience of the British Army. Liddell Hart and Hugh Strachan argue that IW is the British way of war. Callwell is the most influential writer and the first writer of IW/COIN. Was an artillery officer in 1878, later to become a MG. He won the RUSI military essay prize in 186. Callwell served in Kabul in 1880, in the Boer War in 1892. In 1901 his command was badly beaten by the Boer’s and he was not given another command. His conclusion: many fail to understand “small wars” are not “real wars” (or civilized wars). Callwell hoped IW could be kept as short as possible. He viewed the purpose of military history to be providing lessons for use in future military operations. He also believed that irregular warfare would become more common.

Key Points from Callwell: There are three categories of campaigns: 1. Conquest. 2. Pacification. 3. Expediency. Campaigns of IW are in the main campaigns against nature. The enemy holds most of the cards at the strategic level. Because of indecisiveness, IW was often prolonged. “While looking at the stars, we may fall into the ditch” (be careful of applying lessons from big wars to small wars).

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Callwell argued small wars improved the Army – taught reliance, initiative and made the soldiers real men. Did not think technology would be an advantage in small wars. Did not think the “British way” was necessarily the “right way” – Callwell used other theorists’ ideas and applied to British operations. Callwell advocated “drives and sweeps” from experience in South African campaigns. Callwell remains relevant – many of his concepts remain mainstream. He defined “small wars” as those in which one or both sides were not using regular troops. His concern was that the term conveyed an impression that irregular warfare was not a real war.

- **British Imperial COIN Since WWII and the Golden Age of COIN**

British government directed many small wars since 1944, including Aden, Kenya (Mau Mau), Palestine, Malaya, and Cypress. The Army was small during all cases, plus 1/3 of Army was in Germany. Only nine battalions were in the UK for more than twelve months – all other times they were deployed. Discussed various British officers and their experiences. Summation of experiences: 1. COIN Campaigns must have a central strategy and must be subordinate to civilian control. 2. Must have one head, and established command and control. 3. Police must take precedence over the military. 4. All operations must be intelligence-led.

Described operations in Malaya, with lessons learned from Palestine – coined term “winning hearts and minds.” Other lessons: 1. Must secure population – resettled civilians as a result. 2. Isolation insurgents (and/or kill them). 3. Government must win support of population – remedy grievances of population. 4. Provide governance – have transparency in governance. 5. Security forces must be under military control, but have civilian government advisors. 6. Psychological warfare is critical. 7. Use the indigenous population as much as possible to put down the insurgency.

One of the primary objectives of any COIN campaign: win support of more of the population than the insurgents.

- **Dutch COIN Lessons (focus on political strategic level)**

Kitson said “there is no such thing as a purely military solution in COIN, it is primarily political.” It is, therefore, incumbent upon politicians to define the strategy. Presenter said COIN campaigns need political support at home, otherwise there can be no military operation. Many military operations come to an end because of lack of political support (noted recent Dutch withdrawal of support to Afghanistan). Also, the Dutch people simply did not understand the reasons for deploying troops to that country.

Discussed Dutch military operation in Uruzgan – 2005. Made sense for Dutch involvement, but strong debate about whether operations would be “security” or “stability”. Progressives strongly opposed fighting but advocated “dialogues, development, and diplomacy – only security at the rear end.” Public support dropped significantly from 2006-2009.

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Discussed Dutch operations from 2006. Established inkspots – eliminated many insurgents during Operation Perth, but did not hold areas and more insurgents came back, like water. First lesson for Dutch: must hold to secured areas.

Conducted second operation in 2007, Operation Spin Ghar. Cleared area and then built combat outposts, but insurgents came back again. Part of the reason for Taliban resurgence is that the Dutch Parliament restricted the number of troops that could be deployed in the area. Conducted third operation in 2009, Operation Tura Ghar. This time cleared the area and built more combat outposts in urban areas and had more relations with local leaders. Had an increase in IED – insurgents were trying to hold the area also. Dutch popular support waned due to IED attacks and media reports that governance was not improving.

Among the lessons from the Dutch experience are: 1. COIN is lengthy. 2. Areas cleared must then be held. 3. Lessons must be taught at both the military and political levels. 4. Politicians must understand COIN principles.

Presenter just returned from speaking to leaders in the Pentagon. Said “it is shocking that just this week there was no clear argument in the Pentagon for continuing military operations in Afghanistan. You would think that the US, experts in strategic communications, would at least be united in presenting a coherent argument.”

Question and Answer Period, Session 1, Overview and Historical Perspectives.

Q: What are the really enduring lessons from current operations?

A: The value of intelligence. Also, media presence demands more transparency.

A: Difficulty in framing a strategy.

A: Stress value of military blending into the population, not staying in compounds.

Q: What is the role of indigenous forces?

A: Trust must be established first at lower levels, than built up. Also, there is a need for State Department presence.

A: There is the whole problem of fighting as an alliance. Need to fight with a unified political objective.

Q: Linking legitimacy, in the Dutch example, how is the role of Afghanistan government responsible for lack of legitimacy?

A: Legitimacy can only be real if government is actually established and in control. In Uruzgan, Dutch supported one tribe, US supported another – there was no legitimacy. Can cite no example of a successful COIN where there was no legitimate government to begin with.

Session 2, Theater Perspectives

- **“Challenges to COIN in Afghanistan”**

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COIN Advisory Assistance Team (CAAT) links strategy to tactics. Observes, assesses, and reports on COIN activities to determine how the force is executing COIN. CAAT has 25-30 primarily SOF retirees distributed among the regional commands along with military officers from seven countries. Now fielding Afghan teams to observe ANSF. Purpose is to get the ground truth to inform strategic decisions and insure ISAF decisions are understood by those on the ground.

Taliban goal is to expel foreign troops from Afg; to overthrow GIRoA; and to establish a Taliban-dominated Islamic emirate with Omar as supreme leader.

Greatest problem facing the coalition is corruption in GIRoA. Not a matter of reconstructing Afg, but of constructing Afg. Coercion by Taliban inhibits support for GIRoA.

Coalition challenges:

1. Partnering
 - Conducted survey in RC (S), (E), and (SW) for ISAF about partnering. About 2,000 responses to 40 questions. Partnering includes relationships, team-building, eat-work-sleep together. Challenges are drug use in ANP, language, and Afghan partners turning on and killing ISAF soldiers. Leaders recognize that partnering is the way home. About 22% of EM say should partner less. Only 2% of field grades say that. Approximately 25% of respondents had partnered during both planning and execution of operations. 50% partnered during execution only. Take-away is that US units grab ANSF partners as they are leaving the compound. ANSF believes they are looked down upon and are not respected.
 2. Measuring COIN effects and progress
 - Hard to measure stability. Increasing violence does not equal increasing instability. Could be that violence is increasing as a necessity to wrest control of an area from Taliban.
 3. Aligning incentives to defeat insurgency
 - Cannot succeed unless reduce corruption and increase good governance. Has to be done by GIRoA. "We are still challenged in that regard." There are some attractive reasons for insurgency with key players: Karzai, GIRoA, Pakistan, business) – somehow must reduce those incentives. "US (and coalition) can lease hearts and minds. GIRoA must win hearts and minds."
- **"COIN Qualification Standards"**

COIN Qualification Standards development is a recognition among commanders in Afg that units coming into Afg were bringing lessons from Iraq that may not apply. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) given lead to develop Afg-specific standards to which deploying units must train. After developing eight tasks, JCISFA sent them to US military institutions for comment. Received zero responses. CAAT sent them to units in Afg and got about 500 responses. Approx 80% said they were good. As part of process, one of the standards was split into two, resulting in nine standards. In August 2010 standards presented

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at COIN shura. On 23 Nov approved by SecDef. Questions remain as to how we build enduring capacity at the operational and strategic levels. Also, are we capturing lessons learned for future use.

Question and Answer Period, Session 2, Theater Perspectives.

Q: How do we convince politicians that we should continue to fund COIN?

A: No matter what you call it, during transition have to do security assistance/reform to be a legitimate and secure host nation.

Q: Should the COIN standards be incorporated into US FM 3-24 and British FM 3-40, *Countering Insurgency*? What is the role of the Sergeant Major? Are the standards enduring?

A: The task was to come up with standards for Afg because what worked in Iraq was not working in Afg. Standards have to be adjusted according to the theater. They are a way to focus the unit.

Q: Can you give any examples of what applied in Iraq but not in Afg?

A: The relationship between violence and stability is not the same.

What are you learning about corruption as it affects the tactical and operational levels? A: We need to condition aid in terms of where it is successful. Corruption has to be viewed in the context of the culture. There is such a thing as positive corruption. Example -- an official takes money "under the table" but uses it to better the lives of people in the area. We need to get close to local Afg leaders.

Q: We seem to be attempting to get COIN as part of our core capability. How do we incorporate that into our core educational curricula?

A: We have to identify tasks. That is not new. But we have to change the mind-set. We have to instill a mind-set that we won't have to relearn COIN. COIN is the future. We have to continue to talk about it.

Q: How can we partner if we are training COIN differently across Afg because different training centers have different approaches?

A: It is incumbent upon junior officers to keep COIN in the military psyche. One problem is the coalition partners and what they are allowed to do by their political leaders. Additionally, a large number of contributing nations are doing most things similarly.

Q: How can we develop police to make them a good COIN force?

A: Goes to rule of law. Police is a challenge. We have a police initiative to field local police for security in many areas that the ANP cannot reach. Tried to have the State Dept do this training, but it did not work so have to go back to the military doing it.

Q: Why is it so hard to understand the link between strategy and tactics in the role of partnering?

A: We are fielding an extraordinary force that can help greatly in the future. May be difficult to make that link because partnering is hard.

Session 3: UK Company Perspectives

Moderator: Mark Twain said “history may not repeat itself, but it sure does rhyme a lot.” Western forces have been in Afghanistan nine years, one year at a time (and with UK, all six month deployments).

- **Lessons from Afghanistan, Operation Herrick 11.**

Was in Sangin, Helmand Province during Operation Herrick 11 (Sep 10 – Apr 11). Atypical deployment, were in Wishtan – more urban – high walled complex, 15-20 foot walls. Within the compounds, there were agricultural areas or plots. Insurgents closely watched the unit – insurgents were creatures of habit. Unit could rarely use fires. When, possible, they would use precision strike. Had an interesting enabler for persistent overwatch: a camera erected on a very tall tower overlooking the area of operations. Used this to effectively counter IED emplacements.

Created enhanced intel cells . Mapped locations of mosques, tribal areas, land use, economic centers, and incidents.

Countered insurgent narrative through shuras with locals. Also by the painstaking work of each patrol in understanding and knowing each compound and tribal leaders. Made some progress – from red to amber overall in the company AO.

General lessons from operations: Importance of ISTARs for each company; wide utility of covert capabilities; influence training; need for greater number of ANSF (only had 25 ANA in the AO).

- **Lessons from Afghanistan, Operation Herrick 12**

Developed an approach for understanding OE/human terrain called “Shade Shift.” Used this approach during Operation Herrick 12, which attempted to shift perceptions from the Red insurgent narrative to green (undecided) to Blue (support to GIROA). On arrival, unit must build comprehensive knowledge of human terrain. Then build structure to affect kinetic/non-kinetic operations.

Described influencers on his village human terrain: insurgents, landowners, refugees, among others. Unit worked at influencing perceptions with the narrative to trust the government, as a pragmatic view. Soldiers got to know the villagers – carried cards with pictures of each one. Gave same cards to ANSF counterparts also. Established Village Development Councils. To exploit this, unit acted as stabilizers – ANA was able to secure the area, opened roads, allowed freedom of movement, resulting in shops being opened. Had no civilian casualties, therefore had no negative IO by insurgents.

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Young local men started joining the VDC (not the insurgents). Dismounted patrols allowed soldiers to engage the locals. After each patrol, unit conducted a shura. Villagers started to expect regular feedback from patrols. After one successful sniper patrol, the unit brought in three dead young men, two of which were from the village (elders had claimed the insurgents were not from their village). Two of the dead men were indeed from the village. The next day, 25 of the elders showed up at the British compound and after getting the attention of the soldiers, merely clapped for the unit, then left. This unit flipped the village from the insurgents to the government.

Discussed numerous lessons. There was no standard way to understand human terrain. Transferring human terrain data is a problem. Also need a political picture to supplement the geographic picture. Had local recruits, but no mechanism to train them into the local police. Not enough money is being applied to training police. Another problem: not easy to link development projects with GIRoA. If had consistent GIRoA representative to accompany the unit during development actions, GIRoA could take credit.

- **Battle Group Perspective, Operation Herrick 12.**

Thought previous presenter's operation in turning a village is a model for COIN operations. Battle Group was in Nahr e Seraj (South), sandwiched between Gereshk and Lashkar Gah, in a green agricultural zone. Was pretty much insurgent dominated. There was clear local perception of the Taliban-controlled area and UK-controlled area. There was no GIRoA influence. Had freedom of movement because of road built previously by Coldstream Guards. Were on a COIN roller-coaster.

Had six lines of operations: 1. Protect communities. Each company was to protect community from extortion, intimidation, violence. Used road as checkpoints. If you can build and secure roads, it can transform an area. 2. Build the Afghanistan Police (whom looked like insurgents). Local policing IS a key solution to security. Have to be careful – the Interior Minister has a cap on number of local police allowed. Also, local police need to be controlled by ANP. 3. ANA. Brits embraced partnering – there were no Helmandis in the ANA units, though. According to Strickland, partnering in its current shape is a cultural trainwreck waiting to happen because there are 1000 ways we offend each other. Thinks mentoring teams are a better approach. Armies are proud organizations, who will offend easily. Thinks current model of eating, sleeping, and living together is inefficient and encourages conflict. 4. Village committees – getting the right people in communities to take action – empowering people to do good work. Example: wheat seed distribution. Gave the seed supply to the village elder to organize and distribute, which gave him the credit. 5. Stabilization and development. Simply a means to an end. Doing this to support military objectives, not just for altruistic desires. 6. Disrupt in depth. Attrition of enemy is important, but must be careful with absolutely no chance of civilian casualties. In spite of that, must maintain the offensive spirit. 7. Information management and intelligence are critical.

Discussion of coherence in COIN. Observations: 1. Influence is key to COIN – changing the people's minds – must target minds. 2. We need to deliver. 3. Local priorities are not always

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our priorities. 4. Must counter intimidation. 5. Police are important, need to triple our investment. 6. Coordinate better.

Thinks we are making progress and can get things to a point that we can hand over to the Afghanistan government, if GIRoA is willing. Must continuously ask whether my action is contributing to public support of the government.

Question and Answer Period, Session 3, UK Company Perspectives.

Q: What capability did you lack and would like to have? Was your training on human terrain satisfactory?

A: Kit (equipment) was okay. Would like covert capability to reduce confidence of insurgents.

A: Training was probably too simplistic – not complex enough to really test the unit. Need more civilian agencies involved in the training.

Q: Regarding risk and mission command and ability to display initiative at low level. Did you have power to take risks?

A: There is an issue of risks – some things are held too high. In terms of tactical decision-making, thinks it is okay.

A: Never felt any tactical restrictions. Had to ensure NCOs and soldiers understood importance of calculated risk.

A: Had immense freedom of actions, almost overwhelming freedom. The training was mostly counter-IED, but still had much small arms training, etc.

Q: How do we get past the thin veneer of understanding the operational environment? How do you get the knowledge passed on to the next unit?

A: The time on station is too short. Five days during battle handover is too short. Living in the community is hard work, but worth it.

A: Regarding continuity, had on-going conversation with a Canadian historian, who knew the AO thoroughly and was “hugely beneficial” in passing on knowledge of OE.

Session 4, COIN Training and Education

- **BCT: “Training and Operations in the COIN Environment”**

Military must build a basic knowledge of COIN. Understanding COIN was our unit’s basic priority. COIN expertise is not just for leaders; it is a requirement for all personnel. Case studies are an excellent way to help soldiers understand COIN. We must go deeper into the units with COIN education and training. COIN consists of areas that are common to all subjects, but there is no existing requirement to demonstrate expertise in COIN-specific areas. A means to ensure that all personnel understand COIN is to test them. Develop a test that requires knowledge of fundamental principles. One observable problem was that attachments had a poor knowledge of COIN.

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Clear-Hold-Build: Hold means to stabilize an area after it has been cleared. Must identify sources of instability, be able to update the information, and, by partnering, eliminate those sources. The first task that leaders must execute is to learn the sources of instability. In the early fight, the only thing soldiers knew how to do was to kill Taliban. Everything else was not resident in the military, but is resident in the US government. Need greater civilian-military integration because of what other organizations can offer.

The Taliban strategy is to do that which has strategic consequences. They think our political will is waning and they can take actions that will run out the clock. There is a false dilemma that says the military must engage either in force protection or conduct effective COIN. Junior leaders must move among the population, take measures to prevent enemy attacks, and do both while executing COIN.

During train-up for deployment, units must develop scenarios for COPs being overrun, soldiers being captured, and having a suicide bomber detonate within a compound. All must be conditioned to react to these type of events beforehand.

Training and education on COIN must begin early in the training cycle.

Partnering. The effects to be gained from partnering are critical, but the unit spent no time training for partnership operations. Leaders must have an intimate knowledge of ANSF operations, to include corruption, planning, logistics, and C2 capabilities. Must learn the Afghan systems for logistics, comms, etc. NSF can fight, but it cannot sustain the fight. Make clear that everyone partners—cooks, commanders, mechanics. Co-locating with Afghans is critical.

Commander's role. Commanders that ask about tribes, sources of instability, and the situation in the villages are good counterinsurgents. Training in fighting can be over-prioritized and COIN training under-resourced. Must maintain frequent contact with the unit to be replaced starting early in the train-up cycle. Should build a training plan based on those contacts.

- **BCT: “Leader Development of Company Command Teams”**

Company command team of officers and NCOs must thoroughly understand insurgency and COIN.

- Understanding COIN requires academic work to include complexity and nuance. Every soldier must understand COIN and every soldier should be expected to read quality material on the subject.
- Studying COIN other than Iraq and Afg is much more productive than studying those two examples because it reduces emotion and emphasis on experience. Better to learn about role of police in the Philippines than role of police in Fallujah.
- Insurgency is a civil/social/security problem at every level—not just at the strategic level. Solving the problem includes task organizing at company level to align people with certain skills to specific tasks.

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- If everyone understands COIN in broad terms, will be able to apply it in a mission command environment.
- Major organizational changes come from outside the organization because others can see what those too close to the situation cannot see.

Recommends as part of pre-deployment cycle that there be Leader Development Seminar that focuses on the strategic environment for field-grade officers; COIN seminar for other leaders; speakers with recent experience; at least six “layman” case studies; and an academic-led COIN seminar.

- Speaker examples:
 - Sarah Chaves, author of *The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban*.
 - USAID speaker on Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework
- Case studies. Each battalion should devote four hours to each study.
- Academic-led COIN seminar. Led by national and international academics. Examples:
 - Carter Malkasian, co-author *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*
 - Brad Carter, instructor at CGSC. No COIN expertise but excellent facilitator of discussion
 - Sergio Catignani, professor at Sussex, author of two studies of Israel and Hezbollah and conventional army in an insurgency
 - Tarak Barkawi, senior lecturer in war studies at Cambridge University
 - Required graduate-level reading for company commander and above
 - Neil Sheehan, *Bright Shining Lie*
 - Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasion, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*
 - Patrick Porter, “Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War,” *Parameters*
 - John Shy, “Revolutionary War,” in *Makers of Modern War*
 - Should conduct frequent small group seminars with peers to encourage discussion.
 - Barkawi would be an excellent developer and facilitator of a US-based scenario that is believable that would force leaders to have to decide whether to bomb the local Wal-Mart that had insurgents inside.
- **Company: “Training and Education After Arriving in Theater”**

Unit hoped to acquire a well-established AO. Instead faced a situation that had a lack of understanding of the environment. There was a lack of partnering. Unit needed to determine who enemy leaders were, how they moved, and tribal rivalries. US patrols focused on boundaries, key leader engagements, and trying to understand situation. Enemy had infiltrated tribal system and used internal conflicts to foster resentment and conduct attacks. Insurgents knew locations of safe havens. No overall tribal leader. Leaders had little regard for government.

Realized needed to do the following:

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- Separate enemy from population
- Establish unity of effort with HTTs, PRTs, AGTs
- Partner at every level. Learn ANSF systems, investigation processes, targeting, and patrolling. Once ANSF saw that by planning with US could receive resources to help accomplish mission. Gave classes to ANSF on COIN using vignettes. Helped ANSF with IO.
- Sent reports of patrols to large list (including HTT, PRT, AGT) so could get advice and assistance from them.
- Used Afghan sub-governor to work with the different tribes.

Conclusions:

- Develop strong leader education program and set conditions prior to deployment.
- Gain and maintain understanding of operational environment.
- Develop, execute, and readjust plan.
- Measure results.
- Maintain systems for continuity to next unit.

Question and Answer Period, Session 4, COIN Training and Education.

Q: Have your ideas of COIN education been accepted in the US Army road to deployment?

A: Amazed at how slowly the nine COIN tasks were developed. If COIN knowledge is not being taught at Army level, must be taught at unit level.

Q: How do you square the perception that CPTs/LTs are being evaluated on the number of schools, wells, etc, they are building verses doing less quantifiable tasks?

A: Leaders should not be evaluated on numbers. If "clear" is the mission, did he clear it?

Q: If "hold," did he partner, identify sources of instability, and address those sources?
About partnering.

A: "Mentoring and partnering are critical tasks." Close partnership is essential.

Q: How much tactical training with NGOs and OGAs did you have prior to deployment?

A: None with NGOs. OGAs was very limited and usually dated. One commander went to the PRT leader training with OGAs. Overall, OGA training was unsatisfactory. Need OGA people who are experts to partner with BCTs. Hard to get with them.

Challenge is that DA is creating Military Engagement Teams from civilian experts who are reservists.

Q: What do you think about this?

A: Having experts in specific areas would be great.

Q: Can the Army you created in Afg be used in other failed or failing states around the world?

A: Unit that can learn to solve problems can be applied anywhere.

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- **RC Level: OP Moshtarak Phase 2**

Discussed geography and number of people sustained by Arghandab River in north part of AO, which joins with Helmand River at Lashkar Gah – sustains 1.2 million people of 3 million in the AO. RC South has eleven contributing nations, core of which is ABCA – 55K troops, eight brigade sized units. Mission is to conduct population-centric COIN operations in the next 12-18 months and support improved governance and development. All orders given were through ANSF units, not ISAF units.

Effects. Afghans do not have freedom of movement, therefore need to focus on improving this. Worked at separation and disruption where there was no troop presence. Also focused on influence operations in Quetta.

Discussed Operation Moshtarek. Used increase in forces to concentrate forces and assert ANSF and GIRoA authority. Focused on AO south of Lashkar Gah. AO is touched significantly by US-built canal system, resulting in heavy concentration of agriculture (like California). Marja and areas adjacent totally dominated by Taliban with heavy opium trade. In observation: RC did not get Corps Commander guidance from higher headquarters (RC was a Division-level command). Command had to study the problem and draft own strategic objectives, as well as tactical objectives for next higher commander. Unit did not want expected violent outcomes to halt operations, like in Fallujah and Maliki in Iraq. Unit needed assurance of political will; resourcing of ANSF units; and resourcing of GIRoA agencies.

Believes “shape” and “hold” were the decisive pieces of the operation (vice clear and build). Shaping involved Karzai significantly. Karzai wanted assurances the population was heavily involved. Shaping does start with a conversation – Afghans need to be listened to. Also, the cell-phone network had to be reconstructed and radio-in-a-box supported.

Lesson learned in population control: used barriers in some areas to block insurgents (could not use everywhere, though). Biometrics was very useful – especially retinal fingerprinting. Shaping also included higher headquarters, CAOC, Aus/Neth/UK, RC itself, USMC, UN agenda, international media. Needed to get Afghans in the lead – ensure orders came from them, and that they were at the helm.

Clear phase. What mattered: Insurgents expected a horizontal attack, so RC played to that. Capitalized instead on all arms maneuver, including aviation and red illumination, air and air space control, Afghanistan constraints in RoE, and media. Was surprised at high number of media embeds (50). Had to account for potential problems along border with Pakistan.

The hold phase was the decisive phase. What mattered: need District governance and leadership and capacity. Learned big lesson on importance of local police. ANP was corrupt. Planned 120 days out. We have learned this is essentially a political problem.

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Measuring effects. Prior to the operation, Governor Mangal could not drive anywhere in Helmand, too dangerous, no freedom of movement. Afterwards, he was able to drive in his own motorcade. So what? As much as managing perception as what happens on the ground. Influence effects are very important. Re-focused on non-insurgency groups. Also, force must be used only in support of an idea, thus appropriate force is the watchword. Also need to inculcate the offensive spirit.

Lessons we forgot: 1. Deputies really matter. Commanders cannot be everywhere or focus on everything. 2. Must have liaison officers to help higher HQs understand your intent. 3. Innovation is great, but must have staff discipline. 4. Sergeants major add real value.

What's really needed? Having capacity for C2, and in the right place. Wasn't until put a BCT HQs in Kandahar City with five MP units did we understand the OE. Could not have conducted C2 without his two US supplied C2 Blackhawks (a lesson learned for the UK Army). Best advice came from GEN Freddie Franks "6 Questions." Also added six others. What capabilities really counted? ISR, Fires, Avn, Engrs, wherewithal to spend money, joint fires, logistics (crucial- 43rd Sustainment Brigade and 60% reserve force). RC Commander must fight his corner in grown-up circles (with COMISAF, others).

Question and Answer Period, Session 5, RC Level: OP Moshtarak Phase 2.

Q: Lessons from the Combat Aviation Brigade?

A: US Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BFSB) – responsible for more control at border crossing, route security. Was successful.

Q: What lessons can we learn from other countries in training ANP?

A: Think ANP is both a problem and solution. Need to be careful in what we train. In most cases, they are little better than security guards. Only about 5% of ANA was recruited from southern Afghanistan. US MPs have the capacity to build police, but need real policemen to train ANP on basic police tasks and how to operate among the people.

Q: Were you surprised by the strength of the insurgency?

A: Yes, media story entitled "The Bleeding Ulcer." We learned many lessons: removing local police, lack of effective district governor. Now, every Afghan in Marja is waiting to see who to support: insurgency or GIROA – takes time.

Q. Were you pressured to provide results quickly?

A: I felt pressure. At that time, 2014 had not been mentioned. Marja had been denied to the insurgents as a sanctuary. Population of Uruzgan had risen up against the Taliban. Population of Kandahar was leery of what the Taliban would do.

Q: Time is against us. What strategies are there to buy time from politicians?

A: I am unashamed at my use of the media to buy time, same as Petraeus ("he is the director, we are the cast"). The date 2014 has not caused a stir in the media because Petraeus is a master at shaping the political landscape.

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Q: Your thoughts on the endstate of COIN in Afghanistan and the situation in Northern Ireland?

A: It is difficult to see the political endstate. There should be a degree of control.

Q: What is your opinion on UK's ability to conduct COIN operations?

A: Not as capable as its US counterpart. US Companies have C2 capabilities similar to a UK Brigade. However, I am always impressed with UK initiative and creativity. Thinks British Battalions are as good as US Battalions.

Q: How to influence Baluchi tribes?

A: Force levels now prohibit effective influence.

Q: What do you see as the present situation?

A: We must look at Afghanistan next summer and compare it to this summer in order to make a judgment. Insurgents have been squeezed so cannot manage large-scale operations. Ammonia nitrate price has increased ten fold. Taliban leadership has been shattered and has had to withdraw to secure areas. We must innovate and stay one step ahead of the enemy.

Session 6, Government Perspectives

- **“Experiences as a Political Officer”**

Was a stabilization advisor in an Afghan province with mission to look at infrastructure and political negotiations. Only two civilians in district. Was unarmed to lower profile and have a different level of influence as he walked around.

- Dealt directly with district governor to dispel a rumor that 1,000 Korans had been buried under an engineer project. Problem caused by a misunderstanding about the project in which the contractors thought they had permission for the work. Because of Afghan politics did not actually have permission. Differences of opinion resulted in spread of the rumor about the Korans. District governor knew the event had not occurred. Lesson learned was that all parties to a project had to have the same understanding of the truth.
- Another incident was that all cell towers were shut down because of Taliban pressure. Had Afghan officials gather 1,000 signatures from locals to send to cell phone company to ask that system be turned back on. Was an example of how some local officials take up the cause of the people.

Success depends on capacity of the official. First district governor this political officer had to deal with was illiterate. Second saw the position as a reward for fighting the Taliban. Third was a science teacher who was respected by the people. Was difficult to determine who had the most influence in an area. By offering low-value projects (clean out a canal, small farm projects) was able to persuade locals to meet with the Taliban and report back on who were not reconcilable and were fighting because they did not understand what the coalition was actually doing to improve the lives of the people. Had to convince the people that the corruption of the current government was less than that of previous governments.

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- **“PRT Perspective.”**

Civilian leadership. PRT in Helmand was civilian led. More PRTs are being led by civilians. To create a functioning central government, it has to be able to deliver and civilians are best ones to do that. Military is focused on battlefield situation. If Afghans take seriously the credibility of the government, they must see the Afghan government take the lead, not the coalition. That will convince the people that the government is stronger than the Taliban.

A component of the Helmand operation was to provide “government in a box” for Marjah. Afghan civilian government officials came to Marjah at the beginning of the operation. Problem was that ordinary Afghan civilians had no way to get to the town to meet with those officials because of the level of security. And few Afghan officials actually showed up. They had been appointed in Kabul, but decided they did not want to be in Helmand.

Afghan leadership. Vertical integration of government is critical. There must be functioning governments at all levels from top to bottom. There are problems both with government structures and with the people in the government. Simply dispersing money from Kabul to a local area took months. If Helmand were a country, it would be one of the greatest recipients of aid in the world. For the aid to be effective, have to set conditions for receiving it at the beginning. Necessary because in the future the level of aid will be reduced, so, when that happens, how will the government sustain itself?

- **“Strategic Lessons from Stabilization Units”**

Strategic

- All conflicts are different
- An integrated approach is essential. Must have a single-multi-disciplinary, multi-government team tackling the task. Not LNOs; not coordinators; but doers. Is a very complex situation so need to simplify the structure to accomplish the mission. Showed the *NY Times* “spaghetti” chart as an example of complexity. He compared that to a pared-down version with a single team.
- Military and OGA officials must train together. OGAs wide connections with different departments. All must understand what the others are doing. Key is training together and knowing what each individual brings to the table. Then must reach consensus on a single assessment of the problems.

Operational

- How we deliver matters. Tangible activities are aimed at intangible objectives—changing perceptions, relationships, and behaviors. Must understand local culture and develop MOEs that apply to the specific area. Must have transparency in funding and contracting. Must be fair and incorrupt.
- No such thing as ungoverned space. May not be a state government, but there will always be some governance in place. Must assess state of governance, security, and

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justice. Need to learn from NGOs, journalists, etc. Have to convince the people as to why they need a state government.

- Short-term governance is good enough. Meaning—a central govern that fosters a favorable view that it might be able to deliver governance, security, and dispute resolution.
- Health care and education are second behind security to the people. Don't care who provides it.
- Constantly monitoring the situation is essential.

Question and Answer Period, Session 6, Government Perspectives.

Q: What did you say today that 18 months ago was not your perception?

A: The Taliban is not a monolithic group, but consists of competing groups vying for influence. This means there are fracture points that could be exploited. Local Afghans are in dialogue with many of these groups, but not with the coalition of the Afghan government.

A: We really do not know how Afghan problems are fixed by Afghans. We want to fix the problem next week rather than wait for Afghans to do it less well and take a long time. We know Afghans negotiate with Taliban and power companies to provide electricity. That is not a process that lends itself to rapid updates on progress or quick solutions. Need to let Afghans fix problems their way. Must create a situation where Afghans are willing to take the lead.

Q: Does UK governmental departments' COIN doctrine align with military COIN doctrine?

A: Foreign Office agrees with military doctrine on stabilization, but using it is something else. Foreign Office believes that COIN is a military-led proposition. There are not philosophical difference, though, with the military COIN doctrine. A lot of work is expected from the civilian departments. Have to start with what they can physically do.

Q: With limited visibility, how did the government check on projects?

A: Encouraged district governor to send his people to check projects. Take photos. Do not provide full amount of money up front for projects. Required local people to report on how money being used. Then next payment would be made based on progress. Too much money can be a bad thing; eg – don't build a road that cannot be maintained. Big challenge was to convince local officials that PRTs and local British government people have the power to change things by influencing ISAF actions.

Q: What about health and compensation payments? What is the narrative that reaches the Afghan people?

A: Had a police checkpoint next to a clinic so people felt secure coming to the clinic and being treated by Afghan doctors. Had about 100 patients a day. Compensation payment have been made more efficient. What we want to do is have the Afghan government deliver services, not ISAF.

Q: Have things changed in Helmand since the USMC took over?

A: There was excellent engagement between US and UK forces during the handover. No hint that Americans had an attitude of "we know better." People in Sangin will strike deals with

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those who can help them, whether it be Taliban, Afghan government, or coalition. Coalition is offering an option to what the Taliban is offering. In some areas of Helmand there are close links between the people and the Taliban. Not so much in Sangin. USMC and British PRT working together. SOF has been successful in decapitating Taliban leadership. Our education systems focus on how WW I and WW II ended with treaties and reconstruction in a population that agreed and assisted with that rebuilding. But COIN is a complex situation that has not been taught in our history education. Therefore, the people at home have an education that does not reflect the realities of insurgencies.

Session 7: US Company Perspectives

- **US Army Lessons from Afghanistan, Creating Peer to Peer Relationships in Semi-Permissive Environments.**

Unit was furthest northeast unit in Konar Province, in the AO 450 days, focused on enemy-centric operations, which changed after arrival. Tribal structure was flat – had to engage each one. Very poor economic situation – mostly subsistence farmers. 90-100% illiterate. Taliban offered an identity and purpose, and opportunity. 65% of population was below age 25, therefore, could not hope to kill all insurgents. Local village had zero connection with central government, but was surprised at high level of democracy at village level. All men were expected at every shura, and also to vote at each shura. Honor was highly important. Taliban would rather attack without ammo than return to the village without fighting.

Strategy of unit: find a way for all 170 soldiers in the troop to engage, by establishing, cultivating, and maintaining personal relationships with villagers. This seems to be a strong enduring lesson. These peer-to-peer relationships are critical to success. Once this happened, there were drastic increases in civilian reporting of enemy identity, location, plans, etc, also other measures such as number of visits to clinic, and personal requests to see individual soldiers. This peer to peer relationship worked with a large number of soldiers (but not all of them).

Governance: unit conducted pre-briefs with elders before every jirga, to help them understand issues and prepare them for questions. End result was to give perception elders were in charge.

Development: units must be pragmatic, but don't decrease development dollars.

Partnering: worked closely with ANSF unit – planned and executed every operation together. Did not necessarily live together.

- **US Army Lessons from Iraq, Building Local Security Forces – Iraq.**

Context – unit was in Baghdad, 2007 with mission to conduct security sweep and clear as much Al Qaeda-Iraq (AQI) as possible. Result was reduced violence. Also installed Iraqi Army checkpoints after US Army had cleared the area. The people did not believe the Iraqi security

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forces could protect them. Established Joint Security Stations with Iraqi police and US MPs who helped train them. Eventually transferred police responsibility to Iraqi police.

Needed to form local police so worked at training them to pass the Iraqi Police Test. Unit worked to gather prospective police recruit names, and submitted to Neighborhood Council (550 names). The council in turn chose the applicants for training and assignment to local police. Unit paid salaries of local police with SERP funds and also entered biometric data into local information management system. Of this, only had one arrest of 550 for any involvement in AQI. Iraqis conducted all the training.

Key takeaways: need to establish a local police force that will be acceptable to both the local population and host nation government. Force has to be sustainable in terms of size (number of personnel), cost, and prestige. Need to also agree to what a “local” is, with elders.

- **US Marine Corps Lessons from Afghanistan, COIN Applied to Tactical Level.**

The following are examples for how one Marine Company did this in Southern Helmand. Unit was based on LAV25A2. Had 120 personnel, four vehicles per platoon. Focused training on basic combat skills, rifle marksmanship, weapons marksmanship. Unit did not have opportunity for Afghan specific training, but did go to NTC (29 Palms was booked).

Had a kinetic mission first to clear Taliban – create security bubble to extend and influence GIRoA. Each platoon was assigned a habitual area, and built relationships. Reinforced success with an IO campaign. Unit leadership partnered strongly with District Governor (who was only 26 years old). Unit helped Governor, Police, and Elders build a justice system quickly. Coordinated construction projects with local leaders. Afghans always asked “How long will you be here?” They had seen Brits, US, Russians, and money come and go. Were concerned about the future if/when the Americans leave.

- **US Marine Corps Lessons from Afghanistan**

Unit mission was ground penetration in Marja, which consisted of clearing operations for 208 days. Key points: enacted company level intelligence capability by assigning an intelligence Marine to each company – worked well. Lesson regarding Forward Operating Bases – Unit put FOBs to far apart – could not provide mutual support. FOBs and COPs must be located so as to control the roads. Checkpoints are important to the Afghans because are a sign of security.

Regarding ANA: Trained with ANA, allowing integrated operations. Took several days for Marines and ANA to become acquainted, but soon accepted each other – worked well. Regarding Rules of Engagement: Is it too restrictive? When under fire, it does not matter, can return fire and receive all the support needed.

Regarding preventing kinetic engagements: perception (among Afghan locals) is reality – if had a stray round or two, it would close the bazaar – merchants and people would leave.

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Therefore, had to be careful with direct/indirect fires. Regarding Counter-IED: most effective method was to build relationships with local population, who would prevent IEDs or provide info on emplacement. Need to get locals involved in providing their own security—sort of live a neighborhood watch.

Question and Answer Period, Session 7: US Company Perspectives.

Q: Based on your experience, what would you change in your pre-deployment training?

A: Decrease obsession with security operations and increase academics on development, governance, consensus building, and partnering.

A: Agree, would train junior leaders on influence building, and partnering . Would also train more on company intelligence team.

A: Would focus training on ethical decision making.

A: Would train more at distributed platoon operations.

Q: Was partnering compatible with six month tours? Were the schools sustainable?

A: Yes, partnering is compatible with six month tours. The key is transitions. They must be effective to ensure progress is sustained.

Q: To make Tribal Elders accountable, what sanctions did you use? Also, what did you do to ensure soldiers executed partnering?

A: Did not force all soldiers to partner – task organized to account for soldiers that had personality/acumen for partnering. Regarding accountability of elders, had to reframe the problem daily – had daily AARs, which was a positive. All soldiers got to talk at AARs.

A: Spent a lot of time with individual soldiers on the “porch”, keeping them informed. Have to explain to soldiers what we are doing and why we are doing it. Also, the “light” came on when soldiers understood they would not have to find IEDs when ANSF could do it.

A: At shuras, would simply ask the elder how/why he allowed an IED into his village, which was a way to shame him (seemed to work).

Q: Comment on whose responsibility to collect and disseminate human terrain lessons learned.

A: It is everyone’s responsibility. Think we lost much of the information.

A: Understanding human terrain is a soldier problem.

A: Absolutely resides at the company. Used census form to build picture of OE. As built picture, had trouble cataloging data.

A: Could have done better job documenting intell.

Session 8, Partnering and Capacity Building

- **“ANSF Development”**

There is a disconnect between Kabul and the police in Helmand. Afghan government has to build security forces while fighting a COIN campaign. There is friction between NTM-A and IJC. NTM-A is building capacity. IJC is fighting the war. The police in Helmand are created by

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influential tribal leaders who may be in cahoots with the Taliban or were themselves benefiting from the sale of drugs. Police are illiterate, have no coherent training, have poor leadership, atrocious living conditions—all of which leads to great attrition.

Need to professionalize the force. Need professional leadership to produce professional police. 50% of police were not trained, but were put to work immediately upon being recruited. After a time created a training center at Lashkar Gar. Taught basic military skills and very basic police skills. Provided some literacy training. Future of police is through the Helmand Police Academy to move from basic survival skills to increasing police skills. People must have confidence that the police are competent.

Military must treat advising as a specialty. “Credibility is the center of gravity for advisors.” Need language skills, instructional skills, and cultural understanding. The point is there needs to be a specialty for advising. Advisors should be immersed with an organization in theater for a few weeks and then return to UK to compete their training based on what they learned in Afg. To train professionally need professional trainers.

- **“Political Implications of Capacity Building at the Tactical Level”**

After the brigade with which he was partnered had cleared the area assigned to them in Helmand province, the speaker’s Brigade Advisory Team was to focus on Hold and Build. Observations of the Afghan partners were that they had weak leadership, inefficient and ineffective logistics, and were illiterate. To meet those challenges, speaker affirmed that cultural understanding is essential. The Team’s focus became to improve leadership skills, develop supply procedures and accountability, improve recruiting and pay, encourage ANA-led operations, and improve ANA medical capability. The partnered brigade is now training Afghan trainers in order to minimize the ISAF footprint.

- **“Intricacies of Partnering”**

Had to prove to ANP that Brits were there to support them. Did that by creating a quick reaction force that could respond within seven minutes. Used certificates to recognize ANP proficiency. Pressured leaders to be good Muslims as well as good police. Encouraged them to go to mosque with local people. ANP leaders said that police had to understand Muslim religion in order to understand Muslim culture. Taught ANP map reading, planning, first aid. Let them take the lead as soon as possible. Officer training and community policing needed further training. As trust built, the Afghan police colonel was seen as an alternative to Taliban justice. Improved ANP police stations. Indicated a permanent presence and faith in their ability. Still have logistics and command issues.

- **“Project Legacy”**

Intelligence, law enforcement, and building indigenous capacity are ideas that were mentioned yesterday and today. ANP confidence is growing. Need to create an intel picture that reflects

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the enemy and the population. In Northern Ireland, the British Special Branch police and their HUMINT capability significantly degraded IRA capabilities. Intel collection is essential for long-term sustainability.

Legacy program focuses on getting people to inform on fellow countrymen. Legacy provides advice to Afghans on how to conduct source operations. It professionalizes the intelligence program. Purpose is capacity building, not intelligence collection.

Lessons identified: Local solutions required local police. Need SMEs at all levels. Must mentor at the lowest levels. Number of police trained does not equal greater effectiveness. Afghans must feel comfortable with the program if it is to have long-term effects.

Question and Answer Period, Session 8, Partnering and Capacity Building.

Q: What capabilities do the ANP need that military cannot provide?

A: EC M (Electronic Countermeasures), ISTAR ([Intelligence](#), [Surveillance](#), [Target Acquisition](#), and [Reconnaissance](#)), and attack helicopters are capabilities that ANP cannot master. Community policing has not gotten quite right. We are training people more to be militia than police. Big gap between ANP and people because the police tend to deal harshly with the population.

Q: What were the ANP Colonel's concerns?

A: Gaps in office leadership. He needs the power to promote and relived based on merit. ANP have a very very low starting point. Primarily have to give them the skills they need to survive at a checkpoint. Need to get them to a level where they can enhance their community policing skills and that requires more trainers. Need to strike a balance between giving ANP what they need and making them get it themselves.

Q: What are conflicts between ANA and ANP?

A: Tribal/ethnic conflicts, perceptions of levels of corruption. Are beginning to work together, but have a long way to go. Situation has improved from disdain to distrust. The support provided by the ANP during the elections increased the trust of ANP, but a long way to go. Pay between ANP and ANA has come into line and that has reduced friction. In the people's minds, ANA are held in higher regard than the ANP.

Q: Is arming the Afghan Local Police which resembles a local militia the right way to go?

A: Trying to professionalize the police, but not enough recruits to meet the requirements. There are areas where simply cannot recruit ANP, so need militia in those areas. But cannot get distracted from recruiting ANP. In reduce funding for ANP because of need to fund other projects, that will lead to problems.

Q: How did you handle expectation management?

A: Understood that partnering would be the mission. Had a training exercise that greatly helped us. During training had to determine which officers could partner and which could not.

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Language training and cultural awareness are essential. Hard to get interpreters. Need to practice with them. Afghans know we are not Afghans and that we will make mistakes.

Session 9: COIN Themes: Evidence from Afghanistan

Presenter spent time with British Army, US Army, and USMC battalions during visits in 2010. Would report up the chain of command – at BCT, Division, Corps. 90% of findings were agreed to by chain of command. Key Take-aways:

We have come a long way and we are doing things fundamentally the same (re, COIN). There is no silver bullet, many solutions initiated in different Regional Commands (RC). RC's should be given latitude to execute their solutions. GEN McChrystal commented that all the great ideas are coming from the tactical level. Bottoms up governance is key, and to support locally recruited District Governors. Need to link bottom-up plans with top-down plans. Top down government is not a traditional Afghan structure. Governance must be allowed to develop differently in different areas. It is recognized that GIRoA is replacing leaders who are supported locally with leaders who are not supported locally.

In February, thought ANP was dying, but it had improved by August. Key was local recruiting by ISAF battlespace owner, and mentoring. ANP should be a para-military force that can survive on the battlefield. It will not look like a US or European police force until there is a more permissive environment. Criminal policing is not the priority; protecting themselves and the people is.

Conflict on Police training in Helmand – one by USMC, one by Brits. Training needs to be combined. It is not happening yet, but should be. Also, need to strongly support locally recruited ANP (USMC does, but Brits do not). The British military command would like to, but there was hesitancy within the PRT. Last reports, this is not an issue any longer, there is now buy-in from the PRT. In some cases ANP is returning to the area from which recruited. Battlespace owners are taking control of mentoring them. Leadership is still an issue. Local elder involvement is critical.

Need to recognize that ANA has mission to defend borders and roads and ANP wins the fight against the insurgents.

In areas without an ANP presence, Afghan Local Police (ALP) are being created and mentored by US SF. The mission is to create something for local security. Need to go slowly and get buy-in from elders and GIRoA. ANA is having a tough time doing the hold, hence the need for locally recruited ALP or ANP. Some commanders believe this has to be the main effort because local security is key.

Reintegration: what to do with them?

Who is in charge? PRT, MEF? Need to decide.

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COMISAF guidance and directives have been interpreted as directive in nature with no room for judgment or tailoring. Commanders must be allowed to develop solutions even if those solutions may be applicable only locally.

Lessons Learned from Iraq – where are they? Not there, especially at operational level of war. Should not repeat the same mistake in OEF Afghanistan. Need library of knowledge at each RC, for continuity, and used for training and education. Everyone agrees it's important, but it is not happening. A major problem is getting Top Secret and Secret lessons learned.

Question and Answer Period, Session 9: COIN Themes: Evidence from Afghanistan.

Q: Can you elucidate on who is learning?

A: A lot of lesson from Iraq are still in Iraq. Also, some narratives are being deined in articles. One recent US Division Commander had twelve CDs of lessons learned. No one (the Army) had ever asked him for them. The issue is that the lessons learned are not being collected or disseminated at the operational level.

Q: What is the difference between a shura and a jirga?

A: Shura is more religiously based. If you call it a shura, the Mullah is in assent. Are we going to enable the narrative of the Mullah or elders?

Q: Are there any areas where locals pay for projects instead of ISAF paying for them?

A: Yes, it is good for local labor – they need to be part of the solution.

A: Example of wheat seed distribution – needed locals actually pay for the seed, so there is buy-in. Give-aways have negative consequences.

Q: Kilcullen says that establishing withdrawal dates is damaging. Comment?

A: Yes, withdrawal dates have never helped us. If people knew forces were leaving, they were passive. Unless have viable security forces, people would not commit or support the government actively.

Conference Summation:

In 2006-2007, UK and US both understood COIN. The real issue in Afghanistan was merely meeting the challenges. Question: where are we now? Good strategy by McChrystal. More unity now, began by McChrystal and continued with Petraeus. All complained about resources flowing south, which is a good indicator of a campaign. Both commanders recognize a need for better partnering.

Big effort on reducing strategic momentum of insurgents in RC South, but is it sustainable? The issue is profound across Afghanistan. Must focus on sub-national governance. ANA is superb at adapting – especially at securing resources, but less capable at fighting. Continuity of approach is especially critical for UK with six month rotations.